PERIODICAL ROOM
GENERAL LIBRARY
UNIV. OF MICH.

JAN 9 _ 1935

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXXII. NO. 1: JANUARY 3, 1935

CONTENTS

Power and Causality: ALBERT HOFSTADTER 5

Psychology in the U. S. S. R.: GREGORY H. S. RAZRAN 19

Book Reviews: 24

PIERRE GUERIN, *L'idée de justice dans la conception de l'univers chez les premiers philosophes grecs de Thalès à Héraclite.*

Einundzwanzigstes Jahrbuch der Schopenhauergesellschaft für das Jahr 1934.

HAYM JAFFE, *Natural Law as Controlled but not Determined by Experiment.*

JAJNESWAR GHOSH, *A Study of Yoga.*

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE, *Makers of Christianity. From Jesus to Charlemagne.*

Other New Books and Journals 26

Notes and News 28

PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY

BY THE

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Wendell T. Bush, Herbert W. Schneider.

BOOK EDITORS: George Boas, Harry T. Costello, Irwin Edman, Horace L. Friess, Moritz A. Geiger, Theodore M. Greene, Sterling P. Lamprecht, Harold A. Larrabee, Richard McKeon, Arthur E. Murphy, Ernest Nagel, Robert Scoon.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY is owned by the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., 515 West 116th Street, New York, and published fortnightly at Lancaster, Pa. President, Wendell T. Bush; Vice-President, Herbert W. Schneider; Treasurer, Frederick J. E. Woodbridge; Secretary, Iris Dean.

Communications to the editors should be addressed, Columbia University, New York. Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 515 West 116th Street, New York, or Prince and Lemon Streets, Lancaster, Pa. The annual subscription price (twenty-six numbers) is $4.00. The price of single numbers is 20 cents, except the annual bibliography number, the price of which is $1.00. Advertising rates will be forwarded on application.

Entered as second class matter, March 18, 1921, at the Post Office at Lancaster, Pa., under Act of Congress of March 3, 1879.

ANNUAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY

Covering the scholarly philosophical literature published in English, French, German, and Italian. Classified according to subject-matter and indexed for authors' names.

The first issue, for 1933, is published as a double number of THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Volume XXXI, Nos. 17 and 18, 1934, 56 pages.

PRICE $1.00

Included in the yearly subscription to
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
(26 numbers, $4.00)

For sale at

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

515 West 116th Street **New York City**

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL
OF
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY
FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE,
WENDELL T. BUSH,
AND
HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

VOLUME XXXII

JANUARY—DECEMBER, 1935

1935

LANCASTER PRESS, INC., LANCASTER, PA.

General
Gen. L
Wahr

VOL. XXXII, No. 1 JANUARY 3, 1935

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

POWER AND CAUSALITY

I

POWER is a word which, since the seventeenth century, has seldom been included in the vocabulary of philosophers. The reason for this is directly traceable to the influence of sensationalism in destroying most of the time-worn tools for describing nature, in favor of scepticism and a dependence upon bald statement of uniformities. There was something worth while in the passing out of use of the term, for the tendency had been general to solidify powers into prior actualities in the substances to which they belonged—actualities already complete, to which exercise was only an accidental adjunct. It is indeed the case that powers are prior actualities to their results, but not in a finished sense, not (to use Dewey's excellent term) "grooved." Sensationalism, however, stopped at criticism, neglecting its more important task, that of supplying either new terms or new interpretations of old terms to take the place of those which it had eradicated from philosophic usage. It did this because it was not a complete movement, because its empiricism extended only to the pointing out of the impossibility of making inductive generalizations which would be true forever and to insistence upon the relativity or subjectivity of sensation, without also, through proper analysis of symbolism, showing how more than uniformities could be discovered and attributed to nature.

We shall not here be concerned either with refuting sensationalism or with providing the symbolic analysis which it omitted. We shall take for granted that what science says about nature is substantiated to the degree to which verification of scientific statements is possessed. How such statements can be true of a nature which is not altogether identical with our sensations of it, is a problem lying beyond the present discussion. Our interest is rather in supplying what sensationalism left unaccomplished, a reinterpretation of two outstanding terms used in the understanding of nature: power and causality. We shall thus be able to avoid certain problems which usually hog discussions of causality, especially that of the passage from passive sensation to active natural occurrence, not because they are unanswerable or because their solutions must be taken on faith, but because they should be answered in terms different from those to

be used here. Another reason for not entering upon the problem of knowledge is that, far from the answer to it being necessary for the understanding of power and causality, exactly the reverse is true. The mistake of sensationalism was to forget that to be able to know is to have a specific power, that the knowledge process is a causal occurrence of a definite type, that knowledge has some status in nature, and that by neglecting this status it was neglecting the only means by which the nature of knowledge could be discovered. For it is through the study of the status of anything that its nature, the peculiar activities and functions performed by it within that aspect of the general structure of things to which it is particularly relevant, can be discovered; and to this rule knowledge is no exception.

It is imperative, therefore, both for philosophic purposes and for the resuscitation of an epistemology which has fallen out of step with developments in life and knowledge, that the language used for the interpretation of nature receive redefinition and reapplication. Of no other term is this as true as it is of the term "power." To-day, when every moment of the life of a social being is consumed by the struggle for or the employment of power, when every petty bureaucrat sees as his life's aim the attainment of as much power as possible, when power concentrates at prodigious speed in the hands of him who can garner it, when power hangs in the balance between nations and classes, it can no longer be thought that the meaning of the term, so long neglected in philosophy, is still a dead issue.

II

The best synonym for power is ability. It readily suggests that what is signified is not absolute possession, but a possibility. Furthermore, ability is always for something, to something, by something, as when we say that food which is permissible to a healthy man is not to a diabetic. But possibility is not all that pertains to power. Power is bound up in the mechanism of change. The fact that things do change necessitates the fact that they can change; and this capability for change is marked by power. Thus power is a relational factor, dependent upon change for its elicitation, whilst change is dependent upon it for its occurrence. There is no reason to consider either as prior to the other, since they involve each other mutually and can be explained only in terms of each other.

It is easy to go wrong here in saying what the qualities are which are at the basis of change. One might resort to the doctrine of primary qualities to assert that all change is change of these qualities, and thereby attempt to locate power in their interrelationships. But then those powers which have been treated in philosophic discourse under the names of the living, thinking, spiritual, social, be-

come mysteriously inaccessible to discussion, requiring absurdly transcendental machinery to be exhibited in consistent language. Most dilemmas of modern philosophy derive from adherence to some form of this doctrine, resulting in the denial of efficacious relationship to anything in nature which is not merely characterized by the primary qualities, or, on the other hand, in the denial of efficaciousness to anything except what is *not* physical in this sense. The differences between idealisms and dualisms are more differences of emphasis and valuation than of doctrinal fundamentals. They all suffer from the desire to find certain and definite qualities upon which all change is to depend; and they end by asserting that all but those qualities enter into change only illusorily or dependently, but not efficaciously. Daily life is a sufficient refutation of this sort of doctrine: the materialist writes because he wants his teachings to have their effect in society, the idealist uses pen and ink, or a typewriter, to put his spirit down on paper, yet the one denies the effectiveness of his desires and the other the effectiveness of his instruments. Each sees the other's faults without seeing his own.

The faults of each derive generally from the fallacy of attempting to build a world out of simples. The world is just matter, just spirit, just atom and void, just logical construction, just a chain of simple facts, just a conglomeration of simple qualities—when empirically no one has ever yet succeeded in discovering anything simple in the world except, perhaps, the trust with which these doctrines are held. The case of the "primary" qualities is in point. The most that can be said for them is this: in every natural situation, take analysis as far as you please, every primary quality is exhibited and is necessarily involved in an exhaustive explanation of the situation. It is not the case that in nature there come first a group of qualities called primary, upon which are erected, in ascending order, other qualities called secondary, tertiary, and so on, or that there are, in nature, ultimately simple facts consisting of primary qualities in the most simple relations, out of which all other natural facts are constructed. The more "simple" the so-called fact discovered by physical science, the more subtle are its outlying and ramifying relations to all other precincts of nature; nature is not mosaic, but interpenetrative. What is the case is that in any natural situation there are always exhibited the primary qualities—the qualities which a complete physical science would take as irreducible. These also have their natural situations, situations other than that immediately proper to them, whose natural conjunctions make possible their appearance in that proper situation. Thus the primary qualities are exhibited in the rolling of a ball down an inclined plane. The natural conditions for this occurrence are the plane, the ball, the

table upon which they rest, the earth as a gravitative agency, and so forth. The primary qualities are exhibited in the description of the movement of the ball: they are also exhibited in the description of plane, table, earth. Descriptions of the latter are descriptions of natural situations for the former. Thus the natural situations for the primary qualities, the things upon whose happy interlocking they depend, are primarily qualitied also. One does not seek for building blocks with which to pile up a universe; one seeks within the universe for facts of different functionings. It is childish to believe that we see something simpler with a microscope than with the naked eye.

The error in all arguments based on "simples," like that in a false interpretation of the primary qualities, thus arises from taking some aspect of nature which, socially or scientifically, seems of overwhelming importance or value, and transforming it into the ontologic essence of reality.

We return to the question of the relation of power and change. If, after having said that power is tied up with the qualities fundamental to change, it were to be asked what those qualities were, one would have to ask in reply, "What change?" A change in the affection of a lover for his beloved involves, for example, qualities quite different from those involved in the course of a malignant disease, or from those involved in the extraction of gasoline from petroleum. True, in each of these changes the primary qualities are to be discovered exercising certain functions. And as one progresses in outlook from the physical or inorganic through the organic to the social, one finds repeatedly present qualities which characterize less complex situations. But then such phenomena, when viewed as constituent to so complex an affair, are quite different from the same phenomena taken on their own level. For they have added to them new qualities proper to the whole complex, which disappear to the scientific eye when taken and studied by themselves. It is the added qualities present for the whole complex which make the difference, which make it that sort of change, constitute that change, are its effectuation in nature. Any attempt to explain a change in terms of qualities less complex fails, because it leaves out of account just those qualities which distinguish the matter to be explained.[1]

We have not the space here to define quality, but taking it in its usual sense, as character, it is to be noted that qualities alone will not account for any change, nor is the naming of qualities alone sufficient to characterize any natural object. We may mention the qualities "white," "cold," "round," "crystalline," but, unless one can guess of what these are qualities, they do not afford such in-

[1] C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, Lecture I, Section III.

formation themselves. But when we mention the word "snowball," doubt concerning the identity of the object is dispelled. What the name "snowball" adds in meaning to the names of qualities is a specification of the way in which those qualities enter into activity, the status they have in nature, the sort of history, structure, environment in which they are to be found. It suggests the individual of which the qualities are qualities. Let us, for the sake of brevity, call what is thus further suggested the constitution of the object, meaning by constitution, the way or mode in which qualities are associated together in a particular type of object. What must be avoided is the tendency to think of constitution as something different from the qualities involved, the tendency to think of prior qualities gathered up in a certain way. Qualities never appear in nature except by reason of the particular structure of a natural situation. Constitution and quality, both, are linguistic, symbolic, intellectual abstractions, not ontologically diverse existents. To give a sense of the actuality upon which the light of the distinction between them is cast, we need only run the terms together again—the actuality is the qualities thus constituted, the constitution is qualitied, the qualities are constituted, the thing is the qualitied constitution, the constituted qualities.

These two facts, that qualities are always constituted and that quality and constitution are but abstract differentiations concerning integral wholes, afford the key to the understanding of power.[2] What is first evident is that constitutions are qualities themselves; indeed, so evidently are they qualities that, under the name "substantial forms," they were the chief offenders in the hypostatizing tendencies of earlier philosophy. They are modes, ways, characters of situations. They are qualities of qualities. For the sake of clarity we shall commit the crime of coining barbarous latin names in this connection. Qualities which are qualities of qualities we shall call *secundalia;* the qualities of which they are qualities we shall call *primalia.* This is no absolute distinction. *Secundalia* in one respect are *primalia* in another; the organic activity of digestion is a *secundalium* with respect to the inorganic qualities by which digestion takes place, but a *primalium* with respect to the animal which is digesting. Note that we talk about the same situation all the time, though in different ways.

Although we never find qualities in nature alone and unconstituted, we do find concrete activities and characters of the same kind at different loci. We find mahogany pianos and mahogany trees. Mahogany is a *primalium* both for mahogany pianos and mahogany

[2] In the following, as elsewhere, Aristotle, *Metaphysica,* Book Θ, is more than heavily leaned upon.

trees. We are not clever enough to change the pianos into trees, but we can change the trees into pianos. In more familiar language, the tree is potentially a piano. The quality "mahogany" is the power possessed by the tree, and we call it a power because we are thinking of pianos. Thus calling it does not change its ontologic status; it is just as actual as it was before. And saying that the tree "has a power" does not give to the tree some mysterious constituent it had not before; it gives to the tree an added stature in our thought of it; it points out what was always true of the tree, that it can enter into new situations in virtue of what it is. In short, we can not subscribe to the opinion that a power and an actualized quality are of different cosmical types of being. Powers are as actual as their actualized qualities and actualized qualities are as potential as the powers requisite to their production. The difference is one of specific actuality.

A power is thus always a power *of*. *Things* have powers. Powers fill a place in nature because things have their own prejudices, their own lures and aversions, their own selective habits; and conversely, things do pursue their own ways of being because they are, literally, powerful. This is an important fact. Humanly speaking, it is the fundament of individuality and freedom. Metaphysically speaking, it points to the most characteristic quality of nature: its division into individuals, its ineradicable pluralism, and, at the same time, its organization of individuals, its equally ineradicable socialism. Things do not only exist for themselves; they have powers, and these powers are for and within natural situations, dependent for their being and fruition upon the society to which their possessors belong. To say that there is relativity in nature is to say that nature is an organization of individuals and that power and its actualization are the mechanism by which nature wends its way. But it also means that individuality is not something hard and fast set, that there is no preordainment; power is possibility with respect to change, and change is always possible.

III

It will repay us to give close attention to the status of individuality in nature. An individual is something more than an instantaneous state of affairs, a momentary flash in nature's night: such instantaneities are only phases of individuals. Individuality requires the presence of structure and history and, implied in these, a determinate type of behavior. Structure gives the individual a place in nature, history gives it a rôle, and its activity is the exhibition of its place and rôle. In other words, where there is *continuity* of structure and activity there is evidenced a natural individual.

There is a second sense of individuality, in which individuality depends only upon retention of the same constituents, however radically altered the organization of them be. Thus, if a body constituted by atoms were, by an instantaneous shifting of some of them, in which process there was discontinuity, suddenly to change its *secundalia* and behavior, it could not be said to be the same individual as before, in the first sense. For there is no history here, but only magical transformation. It can, however, be called the same individual in the sense that the material substratum of behavior (in general, the *primalia*) has remained the same (in the first sense).

Power with respect to any individuality which is formal—of the first type—is always rooted in the material identity of the ambiguous individual in that particular case. Linguistically, it is the *man* who can become a criminal or a soldier; actually, the criminal has certain habits (qualities), such as stupidity and a love for lethal weapons, which are powers for soldiery. An error which must be guarded against consists in thinking of powers as active and passive in such a way as to restrict effectuality to the material substratum, or natural situation, of individuals. Although power is rooted in material individuality, it does not follow that there is a new mysterious efficacious quality which a thing has in itself by which, perforce, qualities of a higher order are brought into being. According to this view, since every quality is a quality in a situation, and every such quality is as irreducible to qualities of a situation in which it is absent as they themselves are irreducible to others—irreducible not in the sense that a description of one can not be deduced from that of others, but in the sense that the quality is not to be found, except as possible outcome, of the situation in which it is absent—it would follow that in every natural situation the material circumstances, or the situations in which this situation is to be found, contained or were an effective agency which, at the right opportunity, created a quality. Thus the world would be peopled with little gods, or, God would be inspiring every little thing with His own creative spirit, working within and fructifying nature. But, if it is only remembered that the material and formal are ways of taking things with regard to their circumstances, and that the natural situation of any natural situation *is* the quality itself when natural situations do so happen to be constituted that there *be* the actual qualitative occasion, then it is seen that the error we are exposing is purely linguistic, that the creative quality supposedly inherent in the powers of natural situations is but a reduplication, in each instance, of the actual quality present. Power and quality are not active and passive substances coming together to create a world; activity and passivity are ways of talking about formal individualities and their vicissitudes.

This brings us to the mechanism of causation. Traditionally, causation has been viewed as the process by which a substance or thing brings into being some other substance or affection of it. Difficulties with this conception arise because the words used have lost their original meaning or are incompatible in usage with the meanings imputed to them. It will be advisable, therefore, to take a roundabout way by approaching causation in terms of this traditional definition, first making clear the meanings to be attributed to the terms involved.

The term "substance" has led an anomalous existence in modern philosophic terminology. Dating from Locke it lost, to a great extent, the meaning which it had had until his time. The reason for this is Locke's intent in seeking for substance. The significance of the case of the famous Indian "who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked, what the elephant rested on? to which his answer was, "a great tortoise": but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied,—"something, he knew not what,' "[3] lies in the fact that he was trying to descend from formal characters to natural situations of them in the belief that sooner or later he would arrive at some sort of material substratum which would require no further substratum. But he always arrived at some *sort* of substratum, which, because it was a sort, always did require a further substratum. If one abstracts from the qualities of existents *in toto,* what is left is the bare fact of existence; and this is the sense, though it is not generally admitted, which the term "substance" has born in modern philosophy. But this method of defining substance is unsatisfactory. There is none but a poetic reason for calling existence substance, while there is strong reason for not so doing, since otherwise the use of the general term "substance" does not harmonize with the use of the singular terms "a substance," "the substance," "this substance." For if substance is existence, then to call anything a substance is merely to say that it is existent. But qualities are existent though not substances. There must, therefore, be something implied by the term "substance" which is not implied by the term "existence." It is our immediate purpose to discover what it is.

Existence is not a quality. A projected ideal has no quality added to it when it comes into being. It is not meant to be suggested, however, that entities somehow not in the natural world do enter into it whenever something new appears. Nor is any consideration taken of the question whether really novel elements are coming into being in nature. What is meant is that a proposition

[3] *Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* Book II, Chapter XXIII, Section 2.

may be made which, when made, has no application to anything existing, and which, at a future time, does have such application, without it being necessary to add one jot of meaning to the proposition. A propositional function may have a true value at one date, and a false value at another, without being materially revised.

Only individuals and their qualities exist; and although the existence of individuals is founded upon that of qualities, the existence of qualities always implies that of their correlative individuals. The characteristics of individuality are thus characters which what exists must exhibit. But it is the nature of individuals that they have a structure and history. What exists is thus structural and historical. There is no problem here of getting the static universals of time and order into existence; that becomes a problem only when existence is thought to be a quality different from the things and qualities exhibited in it, however at the same time all character be denied it. Duration is one element of the order of things, and this order is the order of existence. Any entity which does not exist can have order only linguistically, order of the significance of symbols, status in experimental thought; in a word, it is not an entity but a plan, or a plan not acted upon (a dream or poetic rhapsody), which characterizes or is possessed by some real thinker. The so-called entities of logic are not entities; what logical formulae refer to is nothing, since their reference is as yet incomplete; logical formulae are undated shells of thought, filled only when dated. And when shells of thought are filled and true, what they are true of are existing individuals and their qualities.

What exists is not only structural and historical. It is also social. Structure and history depend upon a society within which structure is engendered and history accomplished. The analyses of power and individuality give richer meaning to this: an individual can not be reckoned with apart from the environment which gives it its being and character, so that to speak of the structure of the individual is to speak of the structure of its society determined in a definite manner. At the same time, because an individual is an adventurous structure, a conflux of powers and qualities, because, therefore, structure is not separable from behavior (structure is the function, behavior the exhibition of it), to speak of structure is also to speak of activity, activity which is always social. Structure is what we find when we abstract from particular occasions of social behavior.[4]

[4] This manner of defining structure may not appeal to devotees of mathematical logic; but I believe that it in no way disagrees with the logical notion of structure, while it does give to that notion a metaphysical bearing. Logical structure, as I understand it, consists of relations which are expressed by propo-

It thus appears that the term "existence" is denotative of the *conditions* of structure, behavior, and society, and therefore also has denotative reference *to* what exists, whereas substance is an element *of* what exists. The demand also must be made that substance satisfy the usual requirements: that it be the support of, or lender of unity to, the qualities which, taken together, are qualities of a subject. The term "subject" is used advisedly, and since to all intents and purposes its meaning is the same as that of the term "individual," it will perhaps be better to employ the latter henceforth. In seeking the metaphysical status of substance, then, the search is narrowed exclusively to finding an explanation of the unity of the individual.

The problem solves itself. The individual and the unitary are identical; an individual is a substance and substantiality is individuality. Every individual is constituted, and, as we have already said, every individual is thereby a member of a real society which constitutes it. Constitution is interpenetrative and durational. Substance is thus constitution, the famous "real internal constitution" of Locke, upon which all properties depend and from which all properties flow. How qualities depend on substance is quite clear: taking the case of physics, constitution, expressed in mathematical terms, is the structure (using this term in a broad sense, so as to include recognition of the fact that structure is not merely one aspect of constitution, but is the qualities as constituted) of the individual; and when constants are introduced instead of variables, these constants are in terms of the *primalia,* while the modes of constitution (*secundalia*), stated by the mode of expression or by newly-introduced symbols, are seen to be directly relevant to and constituted by the *primalia,* or, in the expression, expressed in terms of

sitional functions when all but logical constants are replaced by variables. (Cf. Russell's *Analysis of Matter,* Ch. XXIV, esp. pp. 250–251.) But when all non-logical constants are replaced by variables, all demonstrative character is removed from language; what remains consists of the elementary characters involved in the manufacture and use of symbols. The structure expressed by a propositional function of the above type does (or did) exist in nature whenever the function has a value or values which is or are true; but there are important differences between structure as expressed by or in the true proposition and as present in a natural situation. Structure expressed by a proposition is in the proposition significantly, is not directly relevant to, or the structure of, powers or natural conditions suitable to it, has effect in nature only through the *user* of its symbolic expressions, is vacuous, requires demonstration to determine it, and is thus always selectively incomplete. Structure in the natural situation *is* the structure of natural situations, has possibilities for a career in nature, actually works or proceeds through itself, is concrete, requires the rest of nature to exhibit it, and is thus always completed by the rest of the entity of which it is an element. Significant structure is the word, actual structure the flesh. It is actual structure of which we speak in the text.

the *primalia* and their relations. The puzzle of inherence is avoided. The substance is not the group of qualities taken together and subsisting in something else, but is the group of qualities constituted in a determined manner. Constitution is essential to the being of qualities, or, substance is the support, the unifier, the source, of quality.

There is an implication to be drawn. The fact that substance is structural behavior *in concreto,* i.e., the constitution of an active entity, implies the fact that a substance is a complex event. We take event in its ordinary usage as a synonym for happening. The difference between the event which is a substance and that which is a quality may be shown thus: the statement of a qualitative event implies the statements of other qualitative events and vice versa. The statement of all these events together, the statement which, with proper substitutions, will give a statement of any qualitative event involved, is a statement of a constitution or substantial event. The taking of this substance and other associated substances in a wider locus gives opportunity for the statement of further qualitative events of that field, and therefore of further substantial events. There is room for a wider and wider expansion of substantial "levels" of behavior. It is not suggested here that a substantial event is *made up of* divers other events; the so-called qualitative events are all the same event, the substance, taken in different respects.

IV

We return to the traditional notion of causality: wherever a substance or quality begins to exist by the operation of some other, there is an instance of causation. This definition contains two phrases which require explanation: "begins to exist" and "by the operation of some other."

The notion of a beginning of existence seems easy to grasp if one adheres closely to the expression itself. The word "beginning" has an aura of fixity which reminds one of elementary geometry: "from *this* point to *that* point a line is to be drawn." This demonstrative quality of the word seems rigid enough until one begins to demonstrate with it. *Dann wird alles verdunkelt.* Illustration would be tiresome. The fixity of beginnings is a character, not of things natural but of the symbolizations of them. We do violence to nature when we make sharp decisions. This is not to say that there are no beginnings in nature. There are. But natural beginnings are also continuations of processes whose backgrounds are not reported in ordinary language.

This immanence of continuations is made clearer when looked

upon as an instance of the workings of powers and qualities. Every natural occurrence is marked by the appearance, the beginning of existence, of some quality or qualities. But qualities come about because there are already powers or natural situations for their occurrence. A good science predicts successfully. The fact that nature is ancient does not preclude the fact that nature is an inestimable storehouse of novelties; novelty grows out of antiquity.

Of the notion of existence we have spoken before. That, and the notion of a beginning, delineate the milieu in which causation works. Existence, structural, historical, social, is where beginnings are. Things begin by being handed over into existence. Tradition is the rule. Coming into being is an event relevant to a world and a world's history, not a private occurrence devoid of cosmic significance. In brief, a beginning of existence is the beginning of an individual or a quality of an individual, within a society, and is the outcome of, or has its setting within, an historical process.[5]

The province of causality, then, according to the first part of the definition, is the province of nature. The word "causality" singles out that character of nature which constitutes its ever-present interweaving of societies and individuals. But it denotes this character with a force emphasizing the interconnection of all to all, to which attention has been called. Now, while the coming into existence of anything, substance or quality, is always to be explained by recurring to the conditions or natural situations—substances, powers, qualities

[5] The possibility for ambiguity in the use of the words "individual" and "society" deserves note: they can each be applied to the same thing, depending upon the purpose behind their application. A man is an individual within a political society, but a society of organs and systems. Thus the words "individual" and "society" do not refer to some absolute simplicity or complexity of constitution, but only to relative differences. Complexity *in general* can be found to as great a degree in any individual as in any society to which that individual belongs. The complexity in general of carbon would be sufficient to exhaust the studies of the entire human race for the rest of its earthly history, though it is but an element in the industrial life of man. Only in this sense can one say of a piece of carbon that it is less complex than human society—some elements having a rôle in human society exhibit a complexity of all types of activity which carbon exhibits, but beside these, human society exhibits certain types of activity which carbon does not, and to which carbon is in some ways a material contributor. Greater complexity derives from difference in *type* of activity. We may add here also that causality is not removed from societies simply because we use a special name for them. Our failure to look in both directions leads us to neglect the individual aspect of things for their social aspect and vice versa. Human society is at the present day a clearly defined individual, despite the presence in it of so many antagonistic forces. The human body is as clearly defined a society. There is no reason to believe that causality in respect of human society is a different causality from that of the human body: the differences are those of specific cases, they are not general or metaphysical.

—for its existence, the fact that some conditions are more apparent than others, and that in many cases one condition is immediately apparent, leads to the view often taken that a causal process is one in which some single thing is the agent provocateur—expressed by the second phrase in the definition "by the operation of some other." Thus the match that lit the fuse was the cause of the explosion and the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was the cause of the war. The answer to this sort of viewpoint is best given by calling it by a name which will settle its doom: "last-strawism." It is an easy way to break a camel's back, but only at the loss of overlooking all the other blows that had previously laid the camel low.

Causality is another name for change, with the proviso that all change is either of substance or quality. The explanation of change is therefore always structural—there is the structure *of* the change which includes the structures of those events which are the natural situations for that change. Incomplete statement of change is the rule, and in it much of the structure relevant to the change may be omitted: as in bodily movement, the word "body" is used as a substitute for a more complete statement of the situation. Because, however, structure has almost always been viewed as ideal, essential, static, devoid of effectiveness, a frequent temptation has been to appeal to a new ingredient in structural situations, called Force, Mind, God.

But structure can be "abstracted" from natural situations only by the use of symbols. And for structure to be expressed in symbols, those symbols must really be symbols, i.e., really have some interpreter. Where symbols are uninterpreted the only structure pertinent to them is their own physical structure, quite different usually from the structure of those natural situations they would express were they interpreted. Structure is thus never in symbols except as significant, as imputed, except as those symbols are used as substitutes for natural events in their capacity as hints for action. Structure is thus never separable from behavior: wherever there is structure there is some natural event. Structure is the actuality of powers and is potentiality for activity; it is what becomes and is activity when conditions which may be specified for such activity are present. Structure does not require the addition of some agency in order to enter into active natural situations; all that is necessary for *this* structure to be found in *this* activity is that conditions be ripe for it, that potentialities or powers (substances and qualities) be so present in nature that with proper conjunctions *this* activity be forthcoming. What has been symbolized in philosophic discourse by Force, God, Mind, Nature, is but the condition that whatever happens does not happen *in vacuo,* but happens according to natural conditions and circumstances.

In short, when we seek for the cause of any happening, what we seek is *the truth about that happening,* its situation and description. What this description includes is the statement of functional dependencies of various natural factors, structural interconnections of substances and qualities. The law of the lever connects structurally weights and arms: the cause of the swinging of a balance is shown by this law when the weight placed on its pan and the length of the arms are specified. Arguments for an ultimate cause are, like arguments for atomism or for an underlying substance, due to misinterpretation of terminology. Since causality always means structural interconnection there can not be sought any final non-interconnection, anything final which is not conditioned and which is nevertheless a "cause." The misinterpretation arises because it is forgotten that language is never completely specified, that meanings are always universals, that knowledge is always abstract, that a brick is not only a linguistic brick, but is this brick, here and now, and suffering all the conditions influencing anything in nature. The true meaning of "ultimate cause" is just that structural interconnectedness, unspecified for any particular case of it, everywhere to be seen in nature. Causality is an ultimate *character* of nature; it postulates no extra individuals, entities, ingredients, beside those discoverable in nature by the ordinary processes of science. Power, we have seen, is the general name for what things are, considered as contributory elements in the interconnectedness of nature. Things are called causes, therefore, because of their powers, because of their capabilities for entering into natural occurrences, because their modes of constitution in conjunction with the modes of constitution of their surrounding environment become, under proper circumstances, new modes of constitution. Causation is not the creation of one thing by another, but is the becoming of something by other things.

It remains to be said that in the description of natural occurrences two ultimate means stand out: power and causality. In the description of a natural occurrence what is causal is its structural character, while what is constructed consists of terms between which causal relations, relations of structural interdependence, hold, and which are, obviously, powers or qualities, or the substances possessing them. When, logically, we give determination to the relations supposed to hold between qualities, when, i.e., to the *general* names of qualities we add specific relations, we say definitely *what* the qualities are in the existence in which we are interested. In other words, although in the natural situation it is the thing or quality which is the behaving, structural and concrete, in the description of it the causal element present is mirrored in the relational terms of the statement, while the concrete element (which is causal in some other

respect)—the powers or qualities which are *primalia*—is mirrored by the terms of the relations. We break up what is unitary into abstract linguistic differentiations. So long as this is recognized no harm accrues; so long as it is forgotten, the connection of structure and actual behavior becomes a mystery the key to which is offered in the form of some supra- or infra-natural connective agency.

ALBERT HOFSTADTER.

NEW YORK CITY.

PSYCHOLOGY IN THE U. S. S. R.[1]

IN this short paper I will discuss only briefly the main theoretical trends of psychology in the U. S. S. R. The discussion is largely a result of a six-week's sojourn this summer in the Soviet Union, spent in visiting laboratories, interviewing psychologists, and reading nowhere-else-available psychological literature.[2] It is confined mostly to a consideration of psychological trends whose basic philosophies are Marxist-Leninist dialectical and historical materialisms, as occasional drifts in Soviet psychology that are under the influence of mechanism, idealism, or that are "neutral" towards philosophy are not only less different and thus less interesting to the English reader, but also becoming less and less common in the U. S. S. R. The discussion—based as it is upon qualitative impressions as well as upon quantitative evidence—is doubtless colored by my personal interpretations and is perhaps further "adulterated"—my attempts to the contrary, notwithstanding—by my previous psychological training or by what Soviet psychologists call "bourgeois" ideology. If it is so and if the positions of my Soviet colleagues are misstated, I can do no more than cordially invite them for rejoinder and correction. For convenience, I shall divide the discussion into: *General Approach, Methodology, and Philosophy; Speech, and Thinking, Memory and Intelligence; Differential Psychology and Testing; Conditioning and Animal Psychology; Abnormal and Social Psychology; Summary.*

General Approach, Methodology, and Philosophy.—Unlike most of his American colleagues, the Soviet psychologist is really not just a laboratory experimentalist, a fact-finder who finds facts to be used somewhere, by some one, some time. He is above all a scientific worker who is to further and promote the cause of socialist construc-

[1] Discussed informally September 6, 1934, at a meeting of the American Psychological Association in New York City.

[2] I wish to express my sincere acknowledgments to Professors Pinkievich, Buchacho, Spielrein, Borovski, Hellerstein, and Levitt for their extreme kindness and hospitality during my stay in the Soviet Union; I am also indebted to J. M. Sandler and E. Bernholz for invaluable aid in gathering material and preparing the manuscript.

tion. He has first principles with which he starts, objectives towards which he strives, and selects his hypotheses, facts, and conclusions accordingly. He does not profess complete initial ignorance of human nature the fundamentals of which are *a priori* contained in his social philosophy—and his experiments are to further expand his knowledge for the management and transformation of human individuals and groups. If the American psychologist is interested in the prediction and control of behavior without emphasis on the direction of the control, his Soviet colleague is concerned only with the change and control of behavior in a particular direction, a direction pointed by Marx, Lenin, and Stalin—a change from an individual to a collective, from a class to a classless society, and the like. The Soviet psychologist's dialectical materialism commits him to the recognition of dynamic opposing tendencies in psychological phenomena, and—what is even more important—to the emergence, through the conflict of these tendencies, of new qualities, emergents, or higher psychological levels. These new emergent levels of behavior—conscious, verbal, intellectual—are functionally supra-summative and demand new specific methods for their approach and study so that both structuralistic introspectionism and objective atomism are necessarily abnegated.[3]

Speech and Thinking, Memory and Intelligence.—According to Luria and Vigotski, who worked with apes, primitive people, and children, speech and thinking are separate emergents distinct and little correlated in their phylogenetic and ontogenetic histories. There is a pre-speech stage of thinking, a pre-thinking stage of speech, and only at a certain period of development do the two processes cross and interact with each other. A higher level of behavior is then attained, thinking becoming primarily verbal and speech a thinking activity. The emergent nature of speech and thinking and their mutual interaction do not apparently imply that conditioning and habituation, association and adaptation, are not operative at these higher levels. They admittedly are. But their operation is greatly modified and their constituent units difficult to identify so that such generalizations are to be deduced specifically at each level of behavior and not merely transported from reflexes and sensations.

Memory, Luria and Vigotski assert, is the mastery and acquisition of verbal, cortical, or, in general, neuromotor or behavioral tools for coping with situations, while intelligence seemingly is both the ability to acquire such tools readily and their use in novel unroutinized

[3] In dialectical psychology emergence and functional supra-summativeness do not presuppose metaphysical configurational correlates but are held to be merely results of the interaction of parts. The system is thus more similar to the "reaction stages" and "higher units" of Woodworth than to those of Gestalt and of Wheeler and Tolman.

situations. The primary data of memory to be investigated are, then, not stimuli, but the genesis and course of acquisition of neuromotor tools, and a simple memory problem is not the memorization of nonsense syllables the neuromotor tools of which are genetically old, but a new situation. Memory is thus closely related to intelligence, and development in general becomes a continuous acquisition and modification of memory tools and devices. Apparently, however, the accumulation of such tools does not divide society into "memory-propertied" and "memory-deprived" classes with the consequent class struggle. The individual supposedly is to socialize such tools as soon as he acquires them.

Differential Psychology and Testing.—As might be presumed, Soviet psychologists are much interested in differences of an environmental and social nature: class, occupation, degree of socialization, education, and the like. Children of industrial workers, non-industrial workers, clerks, individual peasants, collective peasants, rich peasants or kulaks are variously studied and compared. The comparisons deal not merely with quantitative but also with qualitative and particularly with socially significant differences of children's capacities and reactions. However, contrary to some assertions, individual differences of biological origin are by no means ignored. Under the direction of Professor Levitt, the Department of Genetics of the Medicobiological Institute in Moscow has been conducting extensive research in biological, pathological, psychological, and anthropometric differences including a thorough study of about 650 pairs of twins. The interpretations are quite nativistic, suggesting hereditary factors in phenomena ranging from ulcers to dandruff and from problem-solving to pernicious anemia.

In the field of testing there is much more interest in vocational than in educational and in mechanical rather than in verbal tests. The reason is obvious: difference in objectives. The purpose of educational testing is the classification and separation of children according to their "intelligences," while the aim of vocational testing is to best fit the individual to his job. The first is looked upon with disfavor by Soviet ideologists as tending to create IQ castes, while the second is one of their main tenets. To the stock arguments of American psychologists that the heterogeneity of intelligence retards the superior child, often hinders the inferior and average child, and in general creates maladjustment and makes teaching extremely difficult, the answer is that the classroom is society in miniature, that the teacher adjusts herself to the class, that the superior aid the inferior child, and that in general such coöperation, leadership, and voluntary discipline are objectives of education. On the other hand, vocational testing, psychotechnics, and industrial psychology, under

the direction of Professors Spielrein and Gellerstein, are not only already highly advanced in the Soviet Union, but rapidly embracing more and wider fields for research and applications. American psychologists may, indeed, envy their Soviet colleagues the greater possibility of carrying theory into practice and laboratory ideas into life actualities.

Conditioning and Animal Psychology.—I had a long conversation with Pavlov. He spoke enthusiastically of a series of new experiments in his newest laboratory for the study of the genetics of conditioned reflexes. The newest laboratory, about thirty miles from Leningrad, is an imposing group of buildings, with modern vivaria, special ingenious apparatus, and stimuli-proof experimental rooms walled with cork, sponge, and wool, one and a half feet thick. The experiments are with apes and with several generations of dogs so that the various characteristics of the conditioning of parents and offsprings can be compared and correlated. Pavlov appeared a thoroughgoing mechanist, resolutely criticized "insight" and "gestalt," and accused American psychologists of veiled animism, dualism, mysticism, and "verbalism."

The reflexological school of Bekhterev as well as that of Beritoff have, however, renounced their original mechanistic views. Thus in his latest book Beritoff writes: "It is true that until 1926–1927 it appeared to me, as well as to most of our physiologists and reflexologists, that the science of behavior is no more than the science of reflexes" but "beginning with 1926–1927 I radically changed my views" and "the science of behavior is an independent science with its own specific laws which must not be identified with my studies of individually acquired activities" (*Individually-Acquired Activities of the Higher Nervous System,* Tiflis, 1932, pp. iv and x). Similarly, Osipova of the Bekhterev school says: "The subject-matter of reflexology is all the internal and external interactions of the organism in its bio-social environment and not merely the statics of isolated reflexes and their neural mechanisma" (*Psychoneurological Sciences in the U. S. S. R.,* Moscow, 1930, p. 11).

Aside from conditioning, animal psychology in the Soviet Union is under the direction of Professor Borovski, who has been doing very significant work in this field. He is unequivocally objective but by no means Pavlovian. Absolutely rejecting subjective and teleological explanatory principles, he still readily admits that the laws of animal behavior can not be fully derived from those of conditioning but must be supplemented or even superseded by generalizations from animal performances in more complex situations. Borovski is very familiar with American animal psychology, is exact and careful in his experimentation, critical and even eclectic in his special

interpretations, although of course unitary and dialectical in his general approach and main theories.

Abnormal and Social Psychology.—In the field of organic disorders, although very extensive research is done, there is little of dialectical and theoretical interest to be mentioned. In functional disorders the main etiological emphasis is upon social factors, with some interest in conditioning and experimental animal neurosis. Neurosis is said to be a typical product of capitalism and I often heard Soviet psychologists say that it will continually increase in capitalistic countries, decrease and finally disappear in the Soviet Union. I originally had an ambition to gather statistics on the subject, but the task proved too difficult for the short visit. Occupational therapy is used extensively, psychotic patients often working together with normal. On the other hand, psychoanalysis, superficially akin to dialectical materialism in its dynamism and ambivalence, monism and conflict, enjoys in practice little popularity. Sex and Ego are not very disturbing and introversion is not very fashionable.

Social psychologists in the U. S. S. R are little interested in the surveying of opinions and sentiments, scaling of attitudes and prejudices, testing of character and morals. Such aspects of behavior are seen as things to be changed rather than to be experimented with. There are, however, numerous investigations into the genesis and character of collectives; the relations of collectives to the biological and social traits of their members; cohesion, antagonism, discipline, and leadership; group thinking and group activities; and the like. Collectives themselves are of course considered as higher units, functionally greater than the sum of their parts. In fact, it is the collectives and society in general that determine the function of the individual. For, like the isolated functioning of a reflex, the independent behavior of an individual is only a convenient fiction.

Summary.—Until a very few years ago, dialectical psychology was largely theoretical and philosophical. It debated body-mind problems, sought theses and anti-theses, quoted Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In practice, it borrowed heavily from American and German psychology, often little critical whether the borrowed techniques, methods, and even interpretations were in line with its own philosophical principles and social objectives. This has changed now. Dialectical psychology has become a complete, independent, all-embracing system, with a unique selection of problems and appropriate techniques and methods. Its main tenets are: materialism, dialectics, psychological levels, and above all an emphasis upon the social rather than the individual aspect of behavior. Indeed, con-

sciousness itself, although admittedly biological in origin,[4] is held to be in reality always social in content and *the heuristic value of the conditioned response is not in interpreting social behavior biologically, but in modifying biological behavior socially.*

GREGORY H. S. RAZRAN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

BOOK REVIEWS

L'idée de justice dans la conception de l'univers chez les premiers philosophes grecs de Thalès à Héraclite. PIERRE GUÉRIN. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1934. 115 pp.

A study in the transition from religion to philosophy. In prephilosophical mythology the idea of justice is found in two forms, *Themis* and *Diké*, the former representing the feeling of social obligations, the latter that of physical or legal necessities, but both suggesting a kind of transcendental moral order in the world. From these vague notions Anaximander developed the idea of a quasi-personal cosmic integrity working in the creation and interrelation of particular things. The Pythagoreans dropped the personal character and Justice became a principle defined by number, yet preeminent among numbers in having a spiritual and regulatory force. In Parmenides Justice is ostensibly the goddess who conducts her devotee to Truth; but the initiation and the result are assimilated so that the final idea is that of a necessity of thought. Heraclitus, in his doctrine of Logos, carries the idea to its final stage of objective, cosmic law.

Thus Greek religion contained the sense of all the necessities which weighed on human life, and science grew out of it as the knowledge of nature's legal system. This development was made possible because Greek religion was so largely mythological, that is, interested in the forms of representation rather than in the objects represented. While religion and science continued to interact, Heraclitus, with whom the present study closes, marks a moment when thought was more philosophical than religious.

R. S.

Einundzwanzigstes Jahrbuch der Schopenhauergesellschaft, für das Jahr 1934. Bd. 21. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung. 1934. vii + 328 pp. 11 M.

The volume contains five rather interesting articles on Schopenhauer and one on Buddha: *Der Wesensgehalt von Schopenhauers*

[4] Consciousness, thought, and sensations are the highest product of matter organized in a certain manner. (Lenin, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, p. 34).

Philosophie, by H. Naegelsbach (9 pp.); *Schopenhauer und das Raumproblem,* by F. Lipsius (15 pp.); *Philosophie der Technik,* by C. Weihe (22 pp.); *Schopenhauers Grundlehren und die Wege der neueren Rechtsphilosophie,* by G. Stock (57 pp.); *Les fondements de la psychanalyse chez Schopenhauer,* by A. Fauconnet (11 pp.); and *Buddhas Stellung zur Kultur,* by H. v. Glasenapp (13 pp.). The rest of the volume is devoted to biographical material relating to Schopenhauer, reviews of books including Volumes XIV and XV of Deussen's edition of Schopenhauer's works, and notices of the Schopenhauergesellschaft. The latter seems to have about 500 members.

T. M. G.

Natural Law as Controlled but not Determined by Experiment. HAYM JAFFE. Philadelphia: Privately printed. 1934. vi + 87 pp.

This essay assembles a variety of illustrations, more or less relevant, to show how scientific theories do in fact resemble artistic creations, giving varied interpretations to the same experimental data. This thesis might perhaps be described as anti-positivism. The author would have made a more useful contribution if he could have given us some new advice concerning the allowable limits of such scientific fancy.

H. T. C.

A Study of Yoga. AJNESWAR GHOSH. Calcutta: Sanatkumar Ghosh. 1933. Pp. iv + 425.

The author of *Samkhya and Modern Thought* produces, in this volume, another useful work in Indian philosophy. The present study is much more extensive than that which preceded it, and somewhat verbose; but, still, written in a very fine literary style. Dr. Ghosh does not seek to justify Yoga in the light of modern science or present-day thought, or to hold for it claims of enthusiasts in the East and in the West; but he does endeavor to set forth Yoga doctrines in their own right. To this end he is at pains, from the very beginning, to make clear at each step the exact position of the Yoga. This is the peculiar value of the study. In this respect the first chapter, which deals with the scope and spirit of Yoga, is the most interesting. This value, however, carries over into the other chapters, "Self-consciousness and Intelligence," "The Mind," "Nature," and "Discipline."

G. W. BRIGGS.

DREW UNIVERSITY.

Makers of Christianity. From Jesus to Charlemagne. SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE. New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1934. xii + 256 pp. $2.00.

Professor Case has done a service as valuable as it is difficult in presenting in vivid and compact form the making of Christianity as revealed in its makers. Without benefit of footnotes, but with the benefit of the obvious though unoppressive presence of great erudition, he has written a popular history of Christianity up to Charlemagne, of whom he writes in a characteristically illuminating apothegm, "while Charlemagne's favorite book was Augustine's *City of God,* it was the earthly rather than the heavenly city that caught the imagination of a ruler who was both king of the Franks and founder of the 'Holy Roman Empire.'"

There are three features of the book (admirably indicated, by the way, as collateral reading in courses of the history of the church as well as of philosophy) which deserve special mention. The first is the balanced attitude of the author toward the biographical approach to Christianity or to any other historical process. The second feature of the book lies in its expansion of this two-fold conception of Christian biographical history. Jesus and Peter are "heralds of the new day," and the "new day" in the old Palustinian world is well though briefly described. Paul and the Evangelists are well delineated in themselves and the importance of their "world evangelization" succinctly emphasized. More difficult, perhaps, but done with equal clarity, is the treatment of such men as Basilides, Ignatius, Marcion, Justin, and Irenaeus, as the "early builders of a Christian society," and Tertullian, Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Lactantius as "the protagonists of a Christian culture." It would be hard to match Professor Case's clear, simple account of the significance of the Arian controversy, or his description of the triumph of Christianity in its "Christian imperialization of the Roman world."

On the purely biographical side, the stories are revealingly and, for all their brevity, often movingly told. One could have wished that Professor Case had more space for John Chrysostom and his passage from eloquence to faith, for Gregory of Tours and his piloting of Christianity in Gaul, and for a detailed study of Athanasius whom he makes a most unusually living figure. I. E.

OTHER NEW BOOKS AND JOURNALS

THE PERSONALIST. Winter, 1935. The Recrudescence of Physis: *Wilbur Long.* Pragmatism and Rationalism in Bowne: *E. T. Ramsdell.* Yangchu and Moti: Chinese Egoist and Altruist: *Y. P.*

Mei. Imagination and Reason: *H. W. Carr.* Reflections of a Peripatetic: *R. T. Flewelling.* Wisdom and Religion according to Franz Brentano: *M. Puglisi.*

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. Anno XXV, N. 4. Francesco Ruffini: *M. Falco.* Su la "Nuova Atlantide" di Francesco Bacone: *K. Sternberg.* Erminio Juvalta, moralista e filosofo della morale: *C. Mazzantini.*

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. 34e Année, No. 1–2. La loi de l'echelle dans la nature et dans l'industrie: *F. Mentré.* Le rôle de la cause finale dans l'exposition chez Aristote: *A. Sandoz.* L'idéalisme de M. Brunschvicg: *R. Verneaux.* Du régime temporel et de la liberté par Jacques Maritain: *O. Lacombe.*

DIE TATWELT. 10. Jahrgang, Heft 3. Die Unentbehrlichkeit des deutschen Idealismus für die Weltkultur: *Rudolf Eucken.* Recht und Macht: *Franz Böhm.* Menschenformung und künstlerische Gestaltung im Werke Hans Carossas: *Käte Nadler.* Wahre Gemeinschaft: *Helmut Schumann.* Iwan Bunin: *Fred Höntzsch.*

ANALYSIS. Vol. 2, No. 3. Directional Analysis and Basic Facts: *L. S. Stebbing.* Empirical Foundation for Logic: *Karl Britton.* Report of Three Lectures by Rudolf Carnap.

Dwelshauvers, G.: L'Étude de la pensée. Méthodes et résultats. Paris: Pierre Téqui. 1934. 230 pp. (Lectures delivered at the Institut Catholique de Paris. The first part is a critique of experimental studies of thinking; the second is a discussion of the problems of the unity of the mind with special attention to the theory of spiritual intuition.)

Isbyam, I. C.: Freedom from Inward Conflict. Being a Compendium made by C. W. Daniel of *Metaphysics & Modern Research,* which puts before the reader "such considerations as will facilitate the natural entry and working of the spirit of truth in his mind." London: C. W. Daniel Company. 1934. 58 pp. 2/6.

Lorenzini, May: Qu'est-ce que Dieu? Qu'est-ce que l'être? Paris: Félix Alcan. 1934. 91 pp.

NOTES AND NEWS

We print below the program of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, which was held at the University of California, December 27, 28, and 29, 1934.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27

2:00 p.m. Assembly at the International House.

3:00 p.m. Dewey's Concept of the Individual Socially Evaluated. *E. E. Ericksen*

Growth as the Good—An Instrumental View.
Robert E. Fitch

4:30 p.m. Report of the Committee on the Employment of Teachers of Philosophy .....*E. A. Robinson*

8:00 p.m. Open Forum—Functional Realism.
D. A. Piatt, P. A. Schilpp

Smoker.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28

9:30 a.m. The Ethical Evaluation of a Social Order..*H. C. Brown*
The Conceptual Basis of the Social Sciences.
F. J. Teggart
(Introduced by G. P. Adams.)

2:00 p.m. Some Sources and Early Meanings of American Pragmatism .....*H. G. Townsend*
The Root-Metaphor Theory of Metaphysics.
S. C. Pepper
Thoughts about Schopenhauer .....*B. A. G. Fuller*

7:00 p.m. Annual Dinner.

8:00 p.m. Presidential Address—The Institution as Agency for Stability and Readjustment in Ethics. *J. H. Tufts*

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29

9:00 a.m. Annual Business Meeting.

10:00 a.m. Physics, Biology and Epistemology.....*Hugh Miller*
The American Ethos in the Contemporary Scene.
Edward O. Sisson

The newly elected officers for the year 1935 of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association are as follows: President, James B. Pratt; Vice-President, Henry Bradford Smith; Secretary-Treasurer, Arthur E. Murphy; New Members of the Executive Committee, Katharine E. Gilbert, David W. Prall.

Professor T. V. Smith, Editor of the *International Journal of Ethics,* is taking six months' leave of absence from the University of Chicago, beginning January 1, 1935, to devote all his time to the Illinois State Senate, to which he was elected in November.